The European Union is presently at a major crossroads. The Laeken process which launched the EU onto an explicit constitution-making process, has ground to a halt after the negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands. The European Council at its 16-17 June 2005 meeting decided to postpone the ratification process (by then 10 states had ratified and 2 had rejected) and instead issue a period of reflection. These events represent a significant re-politicization of the European integration process. From a research perspective they underline the need to study the dynamic interrelation between the emerging European polity and its social constituency. In this article we provide an analytical model of EU-constitutionalisation in terms of polity building and constituency building, a model that links institutional performance back to public voice and mobilisation. Our focus on determining the character of the EU's emerging social constituency goes beyond the contentious politics approach because it does not only focus on public voice but also provides a research framework for properly understanding the role of public silence.
Sociology has only recently started to focus on how the EU affects the 'peoples of Europe', in their capacity as collective actors who call for participation and in their capacity as 'silent publics', who develop specific attitudes and expectations towards the EU. Instances of Europeanisation of collective action and of public communication within the multi-level governance framework of the EU have been analysed, 4 but so far this has not shed sufficient light on the social conditions that provide the constraining and/or enabling context for institutional negotiations and normative expectations. Foremost among these social conditions are the visible and audible contentions and claims-making as they spread within the emerging European polity.
In the process of EU constitutionalisation polity-building and constituency building cannot be meaningfully separated from each other. The making of a constitution is the prime example of wilful redesign of polity-society relations. It therefore addresses not only institutional actors and rule-making bodies in their quality as the EU's potential polity but also addresses collective actors, citizens or ordinary people in their quality as the EU's potential social constituency. Or to put it in the words of Tarrow: 'if polity building is occurring in Europe today, it must be seen not only at the summit but in the relations of contention and alignment at the intersection of elite and mass, local, national and supranational actors and institutions' (Tarrow 2003: 2) . European constituency-building indicates this other side of European polity-building. It refers to all kinds of concerns, claimsmaking and collective actions that are mobilised (or simply articulated) in relation to European governance. It further refers to all kinds of public expectations, opinions and attitudes that are shaped in the actors' daily experiences with European governance. It thus evokes the idea of an emerging European civil society in the classical sense of the term, as a particular kind of social interaction and communication that is, first of all and most elementary, different from the state (or the EU governing arrangement) and the market.
Constitutional debates, and this is the neglected subject of research, are not simply about constituting the EU-polity; they are also about constituting the European political society. In normative and institutional terms, constitution-making is analyzed as a process of deliberation and reasoning over the kinds of desirable institutional-constitutional designs of the EU. The constitution is then seen 1) as a mechanism for influencing and controlling policies, and 2) as a mechanism for determining the shape of the polity (i.e. through institutional designs and procedures). Not developed in this traditional account is the possibility for constitution-making also to be shaping the social imagination of the polity, the kind of reflexivity that does not only inform the governing institutions but also the selfconception of the public as a political community, steeped within a polity.
The experience of constitution-making thus points to a different role of the public sphere in which constitutional debates unfold. As Craig Calhoun recently reminded us: 'To see the public sphere entirely as a realm of rational-critical discourse is to lose sight of the importance of forming culture in public life, and of the production and reworking of a common social imaginary' (Calhoun 2003: 257) . 5 Constitutional debates trigger off an additional dynamic within the European public sphere as an 'arena of cultural creativity and reproduction in which society is imagined and thereby made real and shaped by the ways in which it is understood' (Calhoun 2003: 249) . The public sphere that accompanies constitution making becomes an arena of societal self-description and self-imagination (Luhmann 1996; Marcinkowski 1993) . Constitutional debates simulate this political society as a collectivity of collective decision-making and self-determination -in other words: As a democracy (Nassehi 2002 ).
This brings forth two critical issues with direct purchase on the European context.
First is the need to define the mechanisms that make such an imaginary unity of the polity and the social constituency likely. Second is the adaptation or translation of this framework onto the European Union, precisely because of the Union's complex character and democratic deficit. Complexity here may entail significant differentials in the extent and scope of constitutional debate, amplified by ambiguity and contestation as to the very character of this entity. These issues are sufficiently serious as to require us to revisit not only the question of entity but also what kind of legitimacy such an entity can claim in the first place.
The question of the legitimacy of the EU social and political order
A core component that links polity and social constituency is legitimacy. Political legitimacy refers to popular approval and to the way in which public authority is justified. Such justifications open a basic communicative relationship between political authorities and their constituent publics. This replicates a basic sociological insight that the exercise of political power in modern societies can no longer be derived from a given and stable ('divine') order.
Political legitimacy stems instead from a contingent societal order that places substantial constraints on the exercise of political power. The legitimatory requirement thus binds any form of exercising political power back to society. In modern political orders, rule makers and those who are and feel affected by the rule (the polity and its social constituency) stand in a functional relationship to each other.
The concern with the EU's democratic deficit is evocative of the notion of the EU as a political entity that is very much in search of legitimacy . In practice, this means entering a communicative process of justification and reason giving with society. For the European Union, an entity which subscribes to democratic principles (also applied unto itself) there is no other source of legitimacy than society. The democratisation and constitutionalisation of the EU are therefore independent of the good-will of the rulers; it is a functional requirement for the Union as a system of European governance (Trenz and Eder 2004) .
The distinction between output legitimacy and input legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) refers to different degrees and ways of involving such a society. In the first, output, case, legitimacy is simply derived from the performance of European governance that must be made visible to the general but silent public. In the second case, legitimacy is derived from procedures that include the public voice in rule and decision-making. The first 40 years of European integration have revealed the insufficiency of a type of rule making that is based on mere output legitimacy and also how frail the 'permissive consensus' of the 'silent public' is.
Discontentment with the present state of affairs and its deficits in terms of legitimatory procedures and outputs, have essentially compelled EU actors and institutions to raise the standards of legitimacy. If we look at the more recent EU treaty provisions, policy documents, and EU officials' speeches, we find that the relevant standard is that of democratic legitimacy. The EU constitution making process has started from this new consensus on the need to democratise the EU and to base it on a specific form of justification in line with the generally approved normative principles of a democratic social and political order (Habermas 2001; Menéndez 2003, 2004 ).
This new and common sense commitment to democracy is a remarkable achievement for an entity with roots in international law. What is even more remarkable is that the EU has committed itself to a direct and independent form of democratic legitimacy that cannot be derived from the Member States in their quality as democratic nation-states. Conceiving the emerging EU-polity in democratic terms can only mean that the EU also has to enter into a direct relationship with its own social constituency.
This commitment to legitimacy is the central parameter that guides our research efforts. The EU is a polity that has entered the process of democratization, but there is no doubt that it lacks some of the basic prerequisites for democracy. This issue is complicated by the complex, novel and still-in-the-making character of the EU. As noted, it is not a state, nor would the CT, even if it had been fully adopted, make it into a state. The EU is not held together by a genuine public sphere neither can it draw on the solidarity and identity of a unified demos. It is nevertheless confronted with expectations of democratic legitimacy and with claims for participation, membership and belonging.
These observations underline that the legitimacy problem must be addressed not only through normative-institutional model building, but also through developing an understanding of the social dynamics of legitimation and delegitimation in the interplay of conflicting actors/institutions and their relevant publics. Theoretically speaking, this means to turn the 'people(s) of Europe' from a black box into a socially structured phenomenon, and one that is open to sociological analysis. 6 Empirically speaking, it entails investigating the social dynamics of contention and claims-making within an unprecedented social-institutional setting.
Between silence and voice: The EU's social constituency in the making
The EU's social constituency certainly in its present shape is not an entity or collectivity that can be described in terms of membership, nor in terms of sharing particular cultural characteristics and identities. It takes various organisational forms that emerge out of the structural relationship (the ongoing processes of communication and interaction) between EU multi-level governance and the 'ordinary people' (Tarrow 2003) . These 'ordinary people' include all those who feel in some way affected by European governance either as silent or attentive publics, or as collective actors who begin to mobilise their concerns (Trenz and Eder 2004 Constitution-making can then be analyzed as a single opportunity for voicing that structures a particular mode and particular contents of claims and demands. The most blatant form of measuring the voice of the people in the EU-constitution making process takes place through referenda, which confront the 'no' and 'yes' voters of a given and pre-established social constituency. More subtle forms of measuring the voice of the people refer to studies of participatory patterns, political mobilization, or public claims-making in the media that encompasses the whole constitution making process (and not only ratification).
2) Silence which exhibits ambivalence with regard to the legitimatory inputs into the EU political process. There can be no doubt that the old permissive consensus helped to establish the output legitimacy of the former European Communities. In terms of democratic legitimacy, however, silent publics are awkward, as they testify to a lack of enthusiasm on the part of people to become engaged and to identify with the new polity. Even during times of constitution-making, we have to take into account that the majority of the potential Europeans (those who are addressed by their governing institutions) opt for silence. For obvious reasons, we do not know much about the empirical reality of silent publics. One frequently used possibility is to measure silent publics through opinion polls (such as Eurobarometer). In the following we identify additional mechanisms for how to include silent publics in the analysis, through ways of studying collective representations of the EU's social constituency.
The question this distinction raises is why the silent public should be considered as a part of the EU's social constituency as well as how it can be meaningfully addressed and made sense of.
The first reason refers to the ambiguous status of the very notion of permissive consensus within a context of constitution-making, amidst already constitutionalized nationstates. Note that the founding Treaties of the European Communities were grounded on the common national constitutional traditions of the Member States, albeit in a fragmentary and unsystematic manner. This nevertheless helped to set up the conditions under which courts, and very especially the European Court of Justice, were implicitly assigned with the task of clarifying the normative implications of such common constitutional traditions in the concrete political and economic context of the process of European integration (Fossum and Menendez 2005) . This meant that the new construction at least to a certain degree could draw on already justified norms. This by implication complicates how we may interpret silence in political legitimacy terms because it suggests a profound ambiguity in the ensuing European social imagination: people are asked to imagine an order that encompasses the core principles we associate with a democratic-constitutional polity but as situated and as transformed to suit a non-state, non-nation entity. What this transformed entity will look like is not properly explained.
Furthermore, studying silence helps us to counter more or less acknowledged biases in the social context, as well as in the framing of research. As Claus Offe has noted, each society has a '"hegemonic" configuration of issues that seem to deserve priority and in respect to which political success or progress is primarily measured, while others are marginal or "outside" of politics ' (1987: 66) . It is in this connection important to establish where those that are silent can be seen to locate themselves within such a distinction. A related reason refers explicitly to the conceptual lenses we as analysts adopt. As Axel Honneth has noted: (Honneth 2003: 115-6) The underlying problem here is that there is no one-to-one relation between noise and contention on the one hand and suffered pain and injustice on the other. Resourceful actors may more easily and forcefully pursue struggles for recognition than weak and marginalised ones. The silent ones may be the worst sufferers. When placed within the cacophony of contending voices that a profound recognition struggle produces, the contentious action methodology offers very limited assurance that the researcher would pick up on the suffering silent or dispossessed. Here we see an obvious limitation in the contentious politics approach.
A systematic approach to the study of silence may serve as an important safeguard against these problems.
Observing the EU social constituency: a research programme
Within the 'nation-state containers' the social constituencies of claims-making were only exceptionally problematised, and contentious politics unfolded as distributive struggles within a constituted polity. Today, claims-making activities open up to new horizons that increasingly transcend the nation state. 8 In addition to this we observe the unfolding of a new constellation of political culture which is thought of more in recognition than in redistribution terms. 9 The two processes converge in the emergence of an increasingly transnationalised politics of recognition, with possible systemic effects: 'The increased prominence of the politics of recognition is one key indicator of movement beyond the Westphalian era' (Linklater 1998: 32) . A new status politics that is unfolding within transnational institutional contexts underlines the need to conceive of collective actors as constituents of a new polity rather than merely as claimants within existing polities.
Our starting assumption is that social constituencies can be identified through the particular constellations of voice and silence of the multiple publics in relation to the EU constitutionalisation process. A major challenge is how to demarcate the relevant social constituency. Is it the present 25 Member States? Or is it the states that are explicitly affected by EU norms? If so, that would include not only the 25 Member States, but also the 3 affiliated states (EEA), a range of associated states/applicant states and perhaps even a number of would-be applicants (consider for instance Ukraina). A further differentiation refers to 'core Europeans' and 'peripheral Europeans' with regard to which voice and silence obviously takes quite different meanings (Eder 2005) .
There is obviously no objective and compelling answer to this problem of demarcation, since the struggles for membership and recognition are part of the dynamic of how the EU's social constituency comes into being and undergoes constant transformation.
This definitorial issue simply underlines the lessons from the globalisation and The unique character of the EU as a non-state polity prompts attention to the set of standards for democratic and legitimate governance that inform its multi-level institutional framework.
When we compare the democratic standards that the EU appeals to with how the EU is made up, we find a deep standards-practice gap. Precisely how deep the gap is depends (a) on the precise character of the standards; (b) on the type of entity that the EU is and how well-suited such an entity is to put democratic standards into practice; and (c) in what direction the EU develops. If for instance the ratification process is abandoned, the commitment to further constitutionalisation may abate and the EU may revert to a more limited-type entity. It is also possible that the commitment to democracy at the EU level has been not much more than window-dressing. Therefore, to properly establish which mode of legitimacy that the EU seeks to comply with we have to go beyond formal arrangements and look at actual performance.
For an entity-in-the-making such as the EU an equally important issue pertains to whether the EU's claims to legitimacy are consistent with citizens' demands on and expectations from it. Constitution making is a particular opportunity structure for mobilisation and it is important to understand collective actor constellations and the types of claims and demands put forth by them.
Classifying justifications and modes of legitimacy
The point of departure for the intermediation between polity building and constituency building is the historical prerequisite of a public sphere as the intermediary realm of communication and reasoning between authorities and free and equal citizens (Habermas (1989 (Habermas ( [1962 ). All claims that are raised within the public sphere must be justified, taking account of the presence of a general (constituting) public. This linkage between claims and justifications will be used in the following to provide answers to the question of the legitimacy of the EU that is challenged or supported by claims-making. For this purpose, justifications can be classified according to three conceptions of rationality corresponding to three modes of legitimation, which again refer in rough terms to three types of entity (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 438 These modes of legitimation are linked to different governance/government options, and hence provide different answers to the question of the legitimacy deficit of the EU and to the question of efficiency and governing capability. They may also be seen as different paths of institutional development with distinctive answers for how the EU is to handle its legitimacy deficit.
The first option is premised on an economic notion of legitimation. It depicts an enlarged EU that, instead of clarifying and addressing the question of identity and democracy abandons all constitutional aspirations and opts for a looser organisational form that emphasises regulation and binding economic co-operation. This type of organisation is based on an economic-utilitarian mode of thinking. It comes close to the notion of the EU as a special purpose association of functional integration. According to this mode of thinking, the EU is best conceived of as a functional type of organisation whose purpose it is to promote the material interests of the Member States. Such promotion may best be ensured by means of intergovernmental rather than supranational institutions. This notion of legitimation envisages citizens as producers and consumers. It is conditional, as it cannot draw on anything but actual performance. The relevant social constituency is narrow: voice is restricted to problem-solving in functional domains, or to actors who consider their relation to, and involvement with, the EU in utility terms, through the calculus of costs/benefits. The silence of the majority can be seen either as the expression of a permissive consensus or as the indifference of a public that has not developed any particular interest in the EU.
The second option is based on a value-based notion of legitimation. Here the EU's emergence is depicted through the lens of a collective process of self-interpretation, based on a republican-communitarian reading of democracy. Constitutionalisation is a process whose foremost task is to clarify: Who are the peoples of Europe and who do they want to be? In this perspective the EU is a geographically delimited entity but one which has not yet fully discovered a common identity which can serve as the basis for developing stable goals and visions. One prominent possibility is to revitalise Christian and humanist values, which can serve as the foundation on which to develop a deeper sense of unity and community. The ultimate objective of such a strategy is to establish a we-feeling, and a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood required for a European demos. It is this sense of common destiny, a common fate induced by common vulnerabilities that turns people into compatriots who are willing to trust each other, to take on new collective obligations and to agree to redistributive practice. The relevant social constituency is broad: voice encompasses all those who speak of the Union as a value community and propagate the values that the European Union espouses. Voice is further relying on silent but attentive publics which are ready to receive the message and to be included within the boundaries of this value community that sets out who are Europeans and who are not.
The third option is based on the recognition of the need to continue the process of institution building at the political level. The main task of constitutionalisation is to help establish a Euro-democracy. In this perspective, a wider cosmopolitan conception of democracy is in operation. The presumption is that the spectre of popular opinions -emanating from broad public debate (European as well as non-European), transnational movements, (I)NGOs) and supranational and international bodies of norm enforcement -sway decision-makers to ensure the democratic legitimacy of their actions. Decision-makers face the people as rights holders who are not only cognisant of their entitlements (and obligations) but who also mobilize and act to ensure their enforcement. This option presupposes ongoing attention to constitution-making to establish a set of principles that provide the entity with legitimacy. The silence of the public must thus be overcome by enhancing the knowledge, capabilities and rights of European citizens. The relevant social constituency refers to the voice of EU-constituted and self-conceived rights-holders, who approach the EU as a granter of rights and concomitant obligations, and who seek to ensure that the rights the EU espouses also actually influence their lives and actions.
The above matrix can be used to develop the classificatory scheme of claims-making 
Categorising the voice and the silence of the public

The spaces of contention
To address the question of the 'voice' and the 'silence' of the European social constituency it is necessary to establish an overview understanding of the scope and character of public communication and contention that are related to the EU. Research on collective action and mobilisation have noticed a shift from social movement organisations and protest action to a more structured and cooperative approach that includes civic actors and institutions as partners and not necessarily as opponents of EU governance (Marks and McAdam 1999; Eder 2001; Trenz 2001) . From this, the space of European contention could be related to changing political opportunity structures at the local, national and supranational levels outlining the contours of organised civil society in Europe.
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Constitution making can be construed as a particular political opportunity structure (POS) that motivates and channels a specific form of claims-making. Such an analysis should start with describing the relevant ascriptive containers that may prompt people to act and to identify.
11 This would help avoid the pitfalls of existing research designs, which either look at only one particular category of actors (e.g. social movements, NGOs) or concentrate on only one specific sector of claims-making and interest formation (e.g. agrarian policy). 12 The underlying categories of claims-making in the EU can thus be derived from the kinds of concerns and demands that are put forward and mobilised by all kinds of relevant actors. The underlying networks of claims-making are derived from the various relationships between and among claimants and addressees of claims-making in the EU and the particular kinds of actions and interactions that occur between and among them. Finally, silent publics can be related to these various categories and networks of claims-making in terms of representative relationships (or discrepancies in representation).
Developing a proper understanding of the impact of the media public sphere speaks to another neglected subject in research about the prospects for constitutionalising a new kind of social and political order beyond the nation-state. The basic assumption that constitutionalisation is based on the interrelation between polity-building and constituency building presupposes such an intermediary space. Media are the general amplifier of voice and it is only through the media that voice can resonate in the silent publics. The obvious problem of EU second order constitutionalisation is that constitutional debates cannot rely on a uniform media system. Voice and silence must be located instead within a highly diversified media sphere where different publics are addressed; creating different kinds of resonance. Research therefore has to pay attention to how the peoples of Europe form publics out of different media systems and how these media, in turn, shape public knowledge, attitudes, perceptions and identities.
The phases of contention
Constitution making within a democratic context is a particularly important occasion wherein the social constituency is asked to envision itself as a public and as a political actor.
Constitution making also lends itself to such study in more practical terms, as the process is delimited in time and scope. A classical case of a constitutional moment (as depicted for instance by Bruce Ackerman 1991 , 1997 ) is triggered by a signal and unfolds in several stages. For our purposes, to understand the social constituency effects of such a process, it is necessary both to understand the character of the signal and of the structuring of the process, that is, which institutional arenas, actors and publics that the process sets out to, and actually, activates. These factors are important in shaping the patterns of 'voice', and the particular constellation of voice and silence that unfolds throughout the process. Note that a democratic constitution making process relies on voice.
But a constitutional moment, even though delimited in time is not only about voice; it is also about silence, as the process activates and deactivates people through different stages.
The process is such structured as to make it unfold according to a particular constellation of voice and silence. To get at this we can start with the stages of a model-type deliberative constitution making process (Fossum and Menendez 2005) . This conception of the process is consistent with the third mode of legitimation outlined above, and is set up with five phases:
(a) signaling; (b) initial deliberation; (c) drafting; (d) substantive deliberation; and (e) ratification. 13 The different stages of the constitution making process open up and close down access to various types of actors at the different stages of the process. For instance, the signalling moment can be an entirely top-down initiative, whereas the initial deliberative phase is intended to elicit voice, that is to serve as a test of the strength of the social support of this initiative and as such should include both general and strong publics. 14 The drafting phase is more closed and would normally include a strong public.
The point is that to understand the social constituency effects of constitution-making, we need information on the structuring of the process, including information on the institutions that serve as access points for claims-making (such as national parliaments and the European Parliament). This will help us to better understand the role of European institutional actors as facilitators and promoters of the EU's social constituency, and their possible effects on the perceptions and representations of the EU as a legitimate order (according to the models outlined above). Parliaments are 'strong publics' where claimsmaking takes a different form and where participating actors assume different roles bound to institutional constraints. Given that the process is such structured as to contain widely different degrees of access for the public as the process unfolds, it is also important to understand at what particular moments the media come in, how the media agenda-setting is brought about, and the effects that this has.
In voice terms ratification is the critical phase because public debates intensify and address the broader public. In some contexts people are given a direct voice that matters for the success of the overall process (as was clearly seen in the French and Dutch referenda cases). Media attention is therefore expected to be highest in the ratification period. This is a kind of contradiction, because ratification is no longer the period for claims-making to influence the shape and contents of the constitution. The social constituency therefore has only a limited role that is restricted to 'Yes' and 'No', but cannot propose amendments to the constitution. The paradox is that the moment of highest public attention is at the same time the worst moment for voicing substantive concerns. This also serves to underline that social constituency formation is not foremost about influence but about legitimacy, visibility, access and symbolic representation.
Even at the ratification stage the procedure matters for how much voice is elicited. The EU's Member States have chosen a wide multitude of ratification strategies. This is suggestive of a highly differentiated signal. How differentiated this is throughout the process becomes evident when one goes through the stages and looks at how they unfold within each member state as well as studies their cross-constituency resonance. The signal is no doubt differentiated; but the effect need not be so, because of cross-constituency resonance. Here voice and legitimacy do not cohere: the fact that the process is so unequally structured has legitimacy implications, as those constituencies that hold referenda claim to be speaking in the name of those that do not. In turn, negative results in some national constituencies feed back into the process as ambiguous signals, which offer great temptations to respond in a partial, piecemeal way which again helps fragment the process and the social constituency signal itself.
The silence of the public
The basic assumption that has guided our research on the EU's social constituency so far is that European constitution-making opens up an arena of contention in which different collective actors and institutions step forth and mobilise particular interests and concerns. The EU's social constituency is thus perceived as a kind of interactive relationship and communicative network of those that raise their voice in the public sphere. This is a pragmatic approach to doing research because it presupposes actors who through their voice produce the empirical reality that can be recorded directly by the scientific observer. Against this scientific pragmatism, we want to highlight that the public sphere has always been conceptualised as a triangular relationship between those who communicate in the public arena (A and B in their role as speakers and respondents) and the silent publics C as those who attend communicative interactions but for the moment decide not to intervene (Gerhards and Neidhardt 1991; Neidhardt 1994 ). This implies a changing focus on the public sphere not as a relationship of direct communicative exchange (this would only describe what is going on in the political arena) but as an observatory relationship that includes communicating actors and their publics. In the European framework, these structured observatory positions have to be redefined. This implies the necessity to focus on the role of the silent publics in relation to European governance and constitution making.
The silent public cannot be analysed that easily because it escapes usual indicators of social research. Silent publics remain rather invisible and do not leave many traces that can be observed empirically. We encounter them only occasionally, for instance, on occasion of constitutional referenda with high abstention rates. Yet it is difficult to conclude from abstention in referenda to the character of particular groups in society and their expectations with regard to the EU. Silent publics are heterogeneous and amorphous entities and not a group or collective actor that can be described through its structural elements (Neidhardt 1994) . They are constituted precisely by the fact that they do not take action and do not organise. At best, silent publics as part of the EU' social constituency stand in an observatory relationship to the EU and can be measured by the different degrees of attention they pay to European politics (Stichweh 2002: 59) .
Public opinion surveys are the classical research instrument to measure the expectations of the silent public. With the Eurobarometer, social science has a detailed and fairly reliable data source at its disposal for measuring the attitudes of European citizens over time and across the European space. Over the whole process of constitution-making, special
Eurobarometer surveys are available with detailed information on citizens' knowledge, A further argument that underlines the urgency for a shift in the research focus is the biased and selective character of voice in the EU that is seriously restricted by the mobilising capabilities of particular groups. Our concern is that voice in EU constitution-making is linked to old and new inequalities that are reproduced in the European realm. One possibility to check whether there is a link between silence and suppression, marginalisation, and discrimination, is to develop a kind of meta-map of Europe's relevant social dimensions, which contains data on the categories of people that are most likely to be discriminated against and then to hold this up against information on contentious and silent publics.
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National statistics and demographic data usually build on similar categories (minorities, religion, class, sex or age) and can thus be systematically analysed for testing out possibilities for the socio-demographic localisation of silent publics in relation to European integration.
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As a starting assumption we may assume that silent publics relate to particular stratifications 
Categorising collective representations
In normative terms, voice must be linked to representative structures in order to be able to claim legitimacy. Such representative structures are taken for granted at the nation-state level, but are inadequately set up at the European level. Those that raise 'the European voice'
implicitly speak on behalf of the silent publics because the latter figure as part of the justificatory strategies of voice. Voice is therefore not only linked to particular concerns but also to the general claims for representation of those who speak in the name of the public. The problem with inadequate representative structures is that the procedural mechanisms to check the veracity of such claims are inadequate.
In the following, we propose a model in which silent publics are included through claims for representation by those who raise their voice in European constitutional affairs in the name of the public. This points to a different dynamic of social constituency building through particular semantics, images and symbols, which are evoked as a by-product of voicing, and that speak to the constraints collective actors face when seeking to generalize their particular claims. Legitimation is perceived here as a process of generalizing claims, not as pertaining to particular actors and their interests, but to more encompassing groups and their identities. From this perspective, public discourse provides a specific offer of collective identifications as a form of self-reference and reflexivity of the discursive community. We can hypothesize that the public discourse on the constitutionalisation of the EU intensifies such identitarian dynamics of the self-imagination of the Europeans and their belonging. The debate on the conditions for democracy contributes to the particular identity of the community, that is, as one of collective self-determination.
Notably, our proposal to address the question of societal self-representation in relation to constitutionalization differs considerably from formal and substantial accounts of the need for, as well as the shape of, a European identity. The identitarian dynamic of constitutionalization that we want to outline is not something that has to be enshrined in the formal text of the constitution (e.g. through a reference to the Christian heritage as proposed by Weiler (2003) (Eder 2005 ). The assumption is that the discursive practices wherein the Europeans negotiate the conditions of membership and recognition (and this is also what constitutionalisation is about) create a collective self with a sense of its particularity as the 'European people'. To the extent that such experiences are accumulated in the course of integration, a new type of European identity emerges which is based on the collective memory of institutionalised interactions of the past. The process of democratic spill-over triggered off by the EU constitutionalisation Eder 2004, 2005 ) is here turned into a process of identitarian spill-over that simulates the unity of the political society of Europe.
Such mechanisms of European identity construction can be systematically retraced in the opening spaces of contention among the Europeans (albeit as we noted with unequal manifestations, presumably in line with process differences). The research task here is to relate the landscape of interests to the images of the 'collective we' that are generated by collective actors as legitimatory devices in public discourse. The mapping of belonging would embrace several references to silent publics that are called upon through claims for representation of voicing actors (notably, this does not presuppose the establishment of representative structures). Collective identities could thus be measured in the communicative inputs of collective actors that respond to the normative constraints imposed upon them in the European institutional context.
The question is further in how far the emerging and widening space of contention among Europeans creates its own sense of community. Such a basic sense of togetherness can be expected as a result of the ongoing experiences of problem-solving within a particular institutional context. Collective identity could thus be measured as the communicative output of the ongoing forms of public discourse among the participants who recognise each other as belonging to a particular group sharing a particular history, enduring a shared destiny and starting off towards a common future.
Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this article was to help set the research agenda for a broadened understanding of European constitutionalisation in relation to polity and constituency building. This opens a new perspective on European integration as societal integration beyond institutions and policy-making. Independently of the fate of the CT that was agreed upon by the Convention and the governments, but unequally received by citizens, the particularity of the constitutional experience of the EU consists in linking the nascent European society to democracy as a project of collective self-determination. A new social space unfolds for voice and for collective representations of what we call the EU's social constituency. This social constituency is in the making even without a formal constitution. The EU constitution-making process might experience major backlashes in polity building but it might still succeed in building a social constituency.
The new political order that has spread across most of Europe has greatly reduced the scope for exit for those who do not want to be bothered with Europe. This is likely also to affect the role and character of voice and loyalty (as expressed in silence). With constitutionmaking now also explicitly eliciting voice, a new constellation emerges in which the silence of the public can no longer be taken as a sign of tacit support and of the permissive consensus of the people. One possibility is that the option of silence is increasingly taken as an alternative to exit by those who lack capacities or will to raise their voice in European affairs.
In the absence of voice, the silence of the public assumes a signalling function: silence 'speaks' of the possible alienation of the public, it 'speaks' of public indifference and it 'speaks' of latent concerns that can be easily turned into voice (e.g. on occasion of referenda).
As such silence can also be used for manipulative purposes, by proponents and opponents alike. The public silence in constitution-making is thus no longer a supportive condition for institution-building but a risk and uncertainty built into the very process of constitutionalization.
The need for such research should be readily apparent. To understand the legitimacy of the emerging Euro-polity we cannot simply focus on how well the political-legal arrangements comply with normative requirements; we also need to understand the social take and acceptance of these processes. This is widely recognised but as we have sought to demonstrate this needs to be done through devising an analytical framework that is capable of capturing the dynamic interaction of voice and silence within this crucial stage of European integration. The EU might then not have a constitution in the short run. But it might have a social constituency that has raised its voice. The institutional-constitutional licence that this constituency is willing to offer to the Union is a key topic not only for the reflection period that was announced by the European Council but also for the future.
rules, norms and institutions. Constitutionalisation can therefore entail the emergence of a material constitution, whether this is entrenched in a formal written document or not. For the distinction between formal and material constitution, see Eriksen, Fossum and Menéndez (2004) .
2 For institutional and normative analyses of the Convention process see Eriksen, Fossum and Menendez (2004) , Magnette (2003) ; Maurer and Schild (2003) ; Wessels (2003) ; Pernice (2004); Peters (2004) .
3 Prominent critical voices are Grimm (1995) ; Scharpf (1999: 29ff.) ; Weiler (1999: 264ff.) . 4 These include studies on the role of communication, public attitudes and collective identities (Norris 2000; Kohli 2000) as well as on civil society and collective action (Marks and McAdam 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2000; Ruzza 2004) . 13 Note that the other modes of legitimation listed above envision other ways of structuring the process.
14 Strong publics refer to institutionalised deliberations whose discourse encompasses both opinion formation and decision making. In institutional terms, strong publics alludes to parliamentary assemblies and discursive bodies in formally organised institutions imbued with decision-making power, yet constrained by the logic of arguing and impartial justification. See Fraser (1992 
